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PROCEDURE
CRIMINAL TRIAL PROCEDURE
Francis C. Sullivan*
SPEEDY TRIAL
In State v. Reaves' the problem was presented as to the proper
method for raising a claim of denial of the constitutional right to a
speedy trial guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth
amendment, the Louisiana Constitution, and the Code of Criminal
Procedure.2 After noting that the legislature had not provided a
special method for raising speedy trial violations, the court pointed
out that the motion to quash is the one general method of raising all
defenses prior to trial which do not relate to the merits of the
charge.' Finding that the speedy trial defense, if successful, requires
dismissal of the charge, and that from its very nature such relief
must be available before trial, the supreme court had no difficulty in
concluding that the legislature really intended to implement the
speedy trial guaranty when it adopted the motion to quash. While
some might question this finding of intent, certainly the result is
both sound and desirable. It should be noted that this ruling re-
verses a line of prior Louisiana jurisprudence holding that a claim of
denial of speedy trial could not be raised by a motion to quash.'
PRE-ARREST DELAY
The Supreme Court of the United States5 and the Supreme
Court of Louisiana' both have held that the constitutional guar-
antees to a speedy trial do not apply prior to commencement of a
criminal action by indictment or information, or at least until one
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 376 So. 2d 136 (La. 1979).
2. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972); LA. CONST. art. I, § 16; LA. CODE
CRIM. P. art. 701.
3. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 531 provides: "All pleas or defenses raised before trial,
other than mental incapacity to proceed, or pleas of 'not guilty' and of . . . 'not guilty
by reason of insanity,' shall be urged by a motion to quash."
4. See State v. Augustine, 252 La. 983, 215 So. 2d 634 (1968); State v. White, 247
La. 19, 169 So. 2d 894 (1964).
5. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
6. State v. Malvo, 357 So. 2d 1084 (La. 1978).
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becomes an accused through the arrest process. During the period
from commission of crime to arrest, it is normally considered that
statutes of limitation provide sufficient protection against delay in the
bringing of state criminal charges. If a prosecution is commenced
within the period of the applicable statute of limitations, there is
still a basis for dismissing a prosecution if the defense can show that
the delay prejudiced the right of the accused to a fair trial and thus
constituted a violation of the due process clause of the United
States and Louisiana constitutions.7
The court faced a problem of this type in State v. Crain,' in
which defendant filed a motion to quash, alleging that a delay of ap-
proximately six months between the alleged offense and his arrest
impaired his ability to present evidence and to subpoena witnesses
on his behalf. The trial court denied the motion, although the state
showed no justification for this delay; but defendant presented no
evidence of prejudice. At trial, defendant did not testify, nor did he
produce any witnesses in his defense. On appeal he argued that the
pre-arrest delay resulted in a loss of memory of his exact
whereabouts on the days in question and a resulting inability to pro-
duce any witnesses. It is noteworthy that in this case there was no
need to delay the arrest to protect the cover of an undercover police
officer.' The delay was not caused by the state's inability to locate
the defendant; no showing was made that a prompt arrest would
have jeopardized any current investigation,0 and it does not appear
that the delay was the product of the decision-making process the
state used in deciding to prosecute the defendant.11 Against this
background, the court emphasized the applicable six-year statutory
limit,12 found that the prosecution was brought well within this
period, and found that the defendant had failed to demonstrate any
prejudice from the state's delay, thus negativing any claim of denial
of due process. In so doing, the supreme court rejected the oppor-
tunity to change the rule established earlier,'3 by which prejudice
will not be presumed from the delay. Because of the short period of
delay in this case, the result seems entirely fair. However, it does
seem that, considering that a constitutional right is involved in the
pre-arrest cases, that the applicable statute of limitations is a very
7. U.S. CONST. amend XIV; LA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
8. 379 So. 2d 1094 (La. 1980).
9. See State v. Malvo, 357 So. 2d 1084 (La. 1978).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 572 (1). The crime charged was distribution of cocaine
in violation of R.S. 40:967(A).
13. See State v. Stetson, 317 So. 2d 172 (La. 1975).
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long one (six years) designed to prevent the avoidance of prosecu-
tion, and that the accused has great difficulty in demonstrating ac-
tual prejudice, some circumstances may well force the court to
adopt a rule that will have the effect of shifting the burden to the
state to justify periods of pre-arrest delay.14
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
In Faretta v. California" the Supreme Court of the United
States held that an accused has a right to conduct his own defense
without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so.
This has created a number of problems.
State v. Bell" raised the question of whether the defendant
knowingly and intelligently gave up his right to counsel. The court
after reviewing the record determined that the trial judge did not
produce sufficient information from the defendant to determine
whether he actually made a knowing and intelligent decision to
waive his right to counsel. Accordingly, the conviction was vacated
and remanded for a new trial. It would seem that we may be on the
way toward requiring a form of Boykin 7 examination in this waiver
of counsel situation, and unless it is carefully done by the trial
judge, more defendants may find themselves with "two bites at the
apple."' 8
The court was faced with a different and difficult situation in
State v. Harper.'" There an indigent defendant had counsel ap-
pointed in a simple burglary case, but reported to the court that he
did not wish this counsel to represent him and that he wanted coun-
sel to be supplied by the American Civil Liberties Union. On several
occasions the trial judge advised the accused that he had to accept
appointed counsel or to represent himself, and defendant declared
that he would not accept either alternative." With the case in this
posture, the trial judge proceeded to trial with appointed counsel
ordered to remain and render any assistance defendant might re-
quest. The attorney, however, refused to participate in the trial,
14. For another case this term with substantially the same treatment, see State v.
Coleman, 380 So. 2d 613 (La. 1980).
15. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
16. 381 So. 2d 393 (La. 1980).
17. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
18. Justices Blanche and Marcus dissented. 381 So. 2d at 395 (La. 1980) (Blanche
and Marcus, J.J., dissenting).
19. 381 So. 2d 468 (La. 1980).
20. The court advised defendant that the American Civil Liberties Union could
not be appointed to represent him and that the court was under no obligation to ap-
point whatever attorney the accused might request. Id. at 469.
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since he had been advised by defendant that his assistance was not
wanted and he wished to avoid prejudicing the accused's case in any
way. The supreme court held that the trial court was correct in in-
sisting that defendant either accept the appointed counsel if he
wished representation, or proceed pro se. The court restated the
traditional view that an indigent accused is entitled only to the ap-
pointment of adequate counsel, not to the appointment of a specific
person. Furthermore, the court found no difficulty in holding that
defendant's refusal without good cause to proceed to trial with the
appointed counsel amounted to a waiver by conduct of his right to
counsel, despite his vehement statements to the contrary. Faced
with the practicalities of the situation and the consequences of a
contrary holding, the court held the actions to be a knowing and
voluntary waiver of Harper's right to counsel so that he voluntarily
proceeded pro se.
In many city courts the practice has been for the judge to advise
collectively all persons in the courtroom of their constitutional
rights. In LeBlanc v. Watson," defendant, in an application for
habeas corpus relief, alleged that he had not been advised person-
ally of his right to counsel prior to pleading guilty to violations of
the City Code in the City Court of Monroe. In fact, the defendant
claimed to be outside of the courtroom when the judge gave a collec-
tive statement of rights to all present. Refusing to depart from a
previous consideration' of this procedure, the court noted that this
practice offers little assurance that an accused has in fact received
and understood his constitutional rights, and particularly that he
has knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. Spe-
cifically the supreme court held that no waiver of the right to
counsel, express or implied, will be inferred from the silent record
made by the collective warning procedure. It seems clear that the
death knell has been sounded loud and clear for this type of pro-
cedure in the city courts, despite its undoubted contribution to a
speedy and efficient process.
NON-UNANIMOUS VERDICTS - TWELVE PERSON JURIES
An effort to extend the ruling in Burch v. Louisiana" requiring
unanimity in six-person juries to those composed of twelve persons
21. 378 So. 2d 427 (La. 1979).
22. State v. Carlisle, 315 So. 2d 675 (La. 1975).
23. 441 U.S. 130 (1979). See Note, Right to Trial By Jury: New Guidelines for
State Criminal Trial Juries, 40 LA. L. REV. 837 (1980). It should be noted that Burch
was given retroactive effect in Brown v. Louisiana, 100 S. Ct. 2214 (1980).
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failed in State v. Jones." This attempt ignored both the basis for the
ruling, which was the reduced size of the six-person jury, and the
fact that the Supreme Court of the United States has in the past
upheld the use of less-than-unanimous verdicts in juries of twelve.25
WAIVER OF TRIAL BY JURY
Article 780 of the Code of Criminal Procedure" authorizes a
defendant to waive trial by jury and to elect to be tried by the
court. State v. Manning27 raises the question as to the time within
which defendant must exercise this election, since Article 780 is
silent on this point, as is Article 782B. The court used comment (d)
to Article 780"8 to find that a court has general authority to deter-
mine when a defendant may exercise this right and proceeded to up-
hold the trial judge's ruling to the effect that defendant's request to
waive jury trial on the second day of trial and after the jury had
been sworn was untimely. Despite defendant's contention that
grounds for the jury waiver did not exist until jury selection was
complete, the supreme court found that he had failed to exercise his
right timely. We are left to speculate as to the specific meaning of
"timely." This writer feels a rule requiring election prior to the com-
mencement of the voir dire examination would be both fair and rea-
sonable.
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES OF BLACK PROSPECTIVE JURORS
Following last term's reversals in State v. Brown' and State v.
Washington," due to the prosecutor's systematic use of peremptory
24. 381 So. 2d 416 (La. 1980). The same result was reached in State v. McIntyre,
381 So. 2d 408 (La. 1980).
25. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (ten jurors out of twelve); Johnson v.
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972) (nine jurors out of twelve).
26. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 780 provides: "A defendant charged with any offense
except a capital offense may knowlingly and intelligently waive a trial by jury and
elect to be tried by the court. At the time of arraignment, the defendant in such cases
shall be informed by the court of his right of waiver and election."
LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 782B provides: "Trial by jury may be knowingly and in-
telligently waived by the defendant except in capital cases."
27. 380 So. 2d 54 (1980).
28. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 780 comment (d) provides:
This article makes no mention of the time when the defendant must elect nor of
the situation in which the defendant wishes to revoke his waiver. The provisions
of this article have been operative since 1921, and there has been no problem with
such matters. They have been handled satisfactorily under the general authority
of courts to regulate their business.
29. 371 So. 2d 751 (La. 1979).
30. 375 So. 2d 1162 (La. 1979).
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challenges to excuse black prospective jurors, this term the court
faced a number of cases raising the same objection. The court re-
quires that a defendant seeking relief on this basis make a prima
facie showing that there has been a historical pattern of systematic
exclusion-purposeful discrimination-of blacks from jury service
over a period of time through the exercise of peremptory challenges
by the prosecution. Once this has been done, the state must proceed
to show that no discrimination was present in the exercise of the
state's challenges in this particular case. In the three cases" con-
sidered, the supreme court was unable to find any evidence of the
required systematic exclusion of blacks over a period of time, and
hence this assignment of error was unsuccessful in each case.
It should be noted that Mr. Justice Dennis filed a concurring
opinion in State v. Allen3" which reads in part as follows:
I continue to think it unfortunate that this Court should ignore
our state constitution and require a defendant to prove that a
prosecutor has practiced racial discrimination "over a period of
time" before the defendant can, in his one particular case, show
that he has been prejudiced by racially motivated peremptory
challenges.3
It will be interesting to see if the court will extend this view to
the prosecution's systematic exclusion by peremptory challenges of
all those under thirty in possession of narcotics cases or to all
women prospective jurors in certain types of sex cases, should such
a case arise in the proper posture.
It should also be pointed out that Mr. Justice Calogero in State
v. Manning4 listed the appropriate motions for raising the issue of
denial of equal protection by the state's discriminatory exercise of
peremptory challenges as motion to quash the jury panel, motion for
a mistrial, or motion for a new trial.
31. State v. Manning, 380 So. 2d 54 (La. 1980); State v. Allen, 380 So. 2d 28 (La.
1980); State v. Qualls, 377 So. 2d 293 (La. 1979).
32. 380 So. 2d 28 (La. 1980).
33. Id. at 32. See State v. Eames, 365 So. 2d at 1364 (La. 1978) (Dennis, J., concur-
ring).
LA. CONST. art. I, § 3 provides:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. No law shall discrim-
inate against a person because of race or religious ideas, beliefs, or affiliations. No
law shall arbitarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate against a person
because of birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or political ideas or affilia-
tions. Slavery and involuntary servitude are prohibited, except in the latter case
as punishment for crime.
34. 380 So. 2d 54 (La. 1980).
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CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE
The court decided three cases involving the correctness of the
decision of the trial judge in failing to grant challenges for cause. In
the view of this writer all three of these cases were exceedingly
close and might well have been decided the other way. These prob-
lems are largely factual and to a very great extent matters of inter-
pretation. The rule giving vast discretion to the trial judge in the
disposition of such challenges and providing that the ruling of the
trial court will not be disturbed in the absence of a showing of an
abuse of discretion35 is a sound one in this area, provided that
abuses actually are corrected. The reluctance of the supreme court
to reverse a conviction supported by the evidence and to remand for
a second trial because of an error of this type is certainly under-
standable, but the real question must be whether the defendant re-
ceived a fair trial under all of the surrounding circumstances.
In State v. Sonnier," a first degree murder case, one juror was
related to the victims of the crime and additionally was the sister of
the sheriff of a neighboring parish;" another juror initially believed
the defendant to be guilty based upon what he had read in the news-
paper and would require the defendant to change this opinion. The
supreme court considered this second juror to be rehabilitated after
instruction and examination by the trial court.
In State v. Allen, 8 again a first degree murder case, one juror
was the sister and granddaughter of policemen, and another juror
indicated that he would give more weight to the testimony of a
police officer than to that of a lay witness. The suprieme court,
however, found that the jurors had been rehabilitated by further ex-
amination to the extent that they demonstrated their willingness
and ability to decide the case impartially according to all of the law
and evidence.
In the third case considered, State v. McIntyre,9 the decision in
an aggravated rape case provoked a dissent from Mr. Justice Dennis
which reads in part:
I think it unlikely that a prospective juror, his protests to the
contrary notwithstanding, can be impartial after: (1) having read
35. State v. Drew, 360 So. 2d 500 (La. 1978).
36. 379 So. 2d 1336 (La. 1979).
37. The court recognized the "closeness of this issue," but determined that her
"state of mind was not such that she would have been unable to render impartial
justice in this case." Id. at 1352.
38. 380 So. 2d 28 (La. 1980).
39. 381 So. 2d 408 (La. 1980).
[Vol. 41
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a newspaper account of defendant's first trial and agreed with
the guilty verdict after being peremptorily challenged by de-
fendant, or (2) having discussed the case with a fellow employee
who was a member of the jury in defendant's first trial and con-
vinced of his guilt."
This writer has serious doubts about the wisdom of a continued
use of the doctrine of rehabilitation to rebut or really ignore bias on
the part of prospective jurors. Human nature is such that once the
prospective juror learns what the trial judge wants him to say, he
will choose the easy, non-embarrassing way out by protesting his
fairness and impartiality. What will surface during deliberations of
the jury may be something quite different.4 The court in McIntyre
gave the usual effect to rehabilitation.
In all of the above cases, and the many similar cases, it would be
well to consider the effect on the general public of using jurors in
serious criminal cases where there are substantial questions concern-
ing their ability to render a fair decision. The courts. should see that
justice is not only done, but seen to be done.
COMPLETION OF JURY
During the period after the regular jury panel has been selected
but before alternate jurors are chosen, what is the situation when
one of the regular jurors becomes physically incapable of serving?
In State v. Delore42 defendant demanded a mistrial.43 The trial court
denied the motion and instead proceeded to select a twelfth juror
from a panel of alternate jurors on the basis of the little-used article
796 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.44 The supreme court points
out that since the trial court granted the defense two additional
peremptory challenges45 to be used in selection of the twelfth juror,
40. 381 So. 2d at 412 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
41. There are only few instances in which the court has found that a prospective
juror would be partial or biased, despite his statements to the contrary. See State v.
Monroe, 366 So. 2d 1345 (La. 1978).
42. 381 So. 2d 455 (La. 1980).
43. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 775 provides in part: "A mistrial may be ordered, and
in a jury case the jury dismissed, when: . . . (5) It is physically impossible to proceed
with the trial in conformity with law ......
44. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 769 provides: "If it is discovered after a juror has been
accepted and sworn, that he is incompetent to serve, the court may, at any time before
the first witness is sworn, order the juror removed and the panel completed in the or-
dinary course." It is clear that "incompetent to serve" as used in the article included a
disability caused by illness as in this case. State v. Rounsavall, 337 So. 2d 190 (La.
1976).
45. Defendant had exhausted his twelve peremptory challenges on the voir dire of
the original panel. 381 So. 2d at 460.
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the defendant's rights were fully protected and no prejudice arose.
This seems to be a most fair and practical solution to an unusual
problem, and there seems little justification for undoing what was ac-
complished up to that point by declaring a mistrial.
SUBPOENAS IN CRIMINAL CASES
The legislature has taken a significant step forward in the
simplification of the method of obtaining the presence of witnesses
at criminal trials. The cumbersome procedure to obtain a subpoena
for a witness residing in another parish, including a written applica-
tion supported by affidavit and at least a token private hearing by
the court, has now been abolished." As a result all subpoenas
directed for service within the state will issue under the authority
of article 731 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.47
RECESS BASED UPON ABSENCE OF WITNESS
The court previously' 8 has pointed out the distinction between a
continuance and a recess. Article 708" of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure draws the line between the two devices at the commence-
ment of trial, and article 7615" defines commencement as the calling
of the first prospective juror in a jury trial or the swearing of the
first witness in a non-jury trial. Motions for continuances are re-
quired by article 70751 to be in writing, to state specifically the
grounds of the motion, and if made by defendant, to be verified
either by the defendant or by his attorney. A motion for a recess, on
46. 1980 La. Acts, No. 286, amending LA. CODE CRIM. P. art 731. 1980 La. Acts,
No. 286 § 2 provides: "Article 740 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure is
hereby repealed in its entirety."
47. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 731 provides: "The court shall issue subpoenas for the
compulsory attendance of witnesses at hearings or trials when requested to do so by
the state or the defendant. Clerks of court may issue subpoenas except as provided in
Article 739." The method of obtaining witnesses from outside the state is set out in
LA. CODE. CRiM. P. arts. 741-45.
48. State v. Mizell, 341 So. 2d 385 (La. 1976); State v. Hines, 311 So. 2d 871 (La.
1975).
49. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 708 provides: "A continuance is the postponement of a
scheduled trial or hearing, and shall not be granted after the trial or hearing has com-
menced. A recess is a temporary adjournment of a trial or hearing that occurs after a
trial or hearing has commenced."
50. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 761 provides: "A jury trial commences when the first
prospective juror is called for examination. A trial by a judge alone commences when
the first witness is sworn."
51. LA. CODE CalM. P. art. 707 provides: "An application for a continuance shall be
by written motion alleging specifically the grounds upon which it is based, and when
made by a defendant, must be verified by his or her counsel's affidavit."
[Vol. 41
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the other hand, need not be in writing and is strictly an informal re-
quest." Under the terms of article 709"3 a motion for continuance
based upon the absence of a witness must show the materiality and
necessity of the missing testimony, the probability that the witness
will be available at a new date, and the fact that the moving party
exercised due diligence in an effort to procure the attendance of the
witness. The article refers in specific terms to continuances; there is
no similar provision relating to a motion for recess.
In State v. Bertrand,54 when a state trooper failed to appear in
response to an instanter subpoena issued during trial at defendant's
request, the trial court denied a defense motion for recess." Point-
ing out the traditional rule that the disposition of a motion for
recess is largely within the discretion of the trial court, whose rul-
ing will not be overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion, the
supreme court found no abuse of discretion here.
The most significant point of this decision is that Mr. Justice
Marcus, speaking for the court and examining the exercise of the
trial judge's discretion for possible prejudice to the accused, used
the requirements provided in article 709 for motions for contin-
uance. Thus, the court found no prejudice to the defendant, since he
had failed to state the materiality of the missing testimony and the
necessity of the presence of the absent witness. Additionally, the
defendant had failed to exercise and show the required degree of
due diligence in his efforts to procure the attendance of the witness.
This would seem to make it clear that a motion for recess based
upon the absence of a witness should be tested by the same stand-
ard as is a motion for continuance under article 709.
CLOSING ARGUMENT -DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO TESTIFY
In State v. Marcello56 the defense attorney on closing argument
advised the jury that the accused had not testified because of ill-
52. State v. Mizell, 341 So. 2d 385 (La. 1976).
53. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 709 provides:
A motion for continuance based upon the absence of a witness must state:
(1) Facts to which the absent witness is expected to testify, showing the
materiality of the te'stimony and the necessity for the presence of the witness at
the trial;
(2) Facts and circumstances showing a probability that the witness will be
available at the time to which the trial is deferred; and
(3) Facts showing due diligence used in an effort to procure attendance of the
witness.
54. 381 So. 2d 489 (La. 1980).
55. Erroneously referred to by defendant as a motion for continuance, this was, in
fact, treated by the supreme court as a motion for a recess.
56. 375 So. 2d 94 (La. 1979).
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ness. In rebuttal the prosecutor argued that the defendant failed to
testify because he feared cross-examination. The denial of
defendant's motion for mistrial was reversed by a closely divided
supreme court. 7 The court was faced with the question of whether
the mandatory language of article 77058 is applicable to a comment of
the prosecutor after the defense attorney has called attention to the
fact that the accused did not testify. To require a mistrial in such a
situation seems to misconstrue the purpose of the article. It seems
clear that it was designed to afford protection to a defendant who
desires that nothing be said by anyone concerning his failure to
testify. To the same extent that a defendant who chooses to testify
may be cross-examined and impeached, so, too, one who opens the
door and discloses the failure to testify no longer should be pro-
tected against fair comment. This seems consistent with the view of
Justice Marcus in dissent 5 9-that the prosecutor's argument was
merely a fair and reasonable response-and that of Justice Dennis"0
emphasizing the defendant's waiver of the mistrial remedy by his
conduct.
INSTRUCTIONS -CONTEMPORANEOUS OBJECTION RULE
The court took the opportunity in State v. Jefferson6 to stress
the importance of the contemporary objection rule as applied to jury
charges. In this case the jury, after retiring to deliberate, requested
further instructions, and the trial judge proceeded to give the in-
structions and to answer questions from jurors. No objection was
made by defense counsel at this time, and only a general objection
was made for the defense after the jury again retired to deliberate.
This, of course, violates the contemporaneous objection rule, and the
alleged error was not properly before the supreme court.62 The court
reminded us that this rule is not a mere procedural technicality but
one designed to allow the trial judge to correct an error at a time
when this can be done. For this reason, to be timely, objections
must be made before the jury retires. Because of the unique possi-
57. Chief Justice Summers, Justice Marcus, and Justice Dennis dissented. Justice
Blanche, author of the opinion, reluctantly joined the majority. Id. at 96 n.1.
58. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 770 provides in part: "Upon motion of a defendant, a
mistrial shall be ordered when a remark or comment, made within the hearing of the
jury by the judge, district attorney, or a court official, during the trial or in argument,
refers directly or indirectly to: . . . (3) The failure of the defendant to testify in his own
defense .... "
59. 375 So. 2d at 96.
60. Id. at 97.
61. 379 So. 2d 1389 (La. 1980).
62. Despite this waiver of the objection, the court considered the objections and
found them without merit.
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bilities for correction of errors in charges, both original and sup-
plemental, it seems to the writer that the contemporaneous objec-
tion rule should be strictly enforced in this area.
JUROR IMPEACHMENT OF VERDICTS
The supreme court has held that despite the statutory prohibi-
tion63 against impeachment of verdicts, jurors may testify as to un-
authorized communications to the jury or prejudicial conduct by
third persons which might influence the verdict. 4
In Wisham I,65 the supreme court remanded the case for a hear-
ing on defendant's motion for new trial directing the trial court to
hear evidence from the jurors concerning whether they viewed the
arrest of the defense alibi witness for perjury and whether the other
jurors were informed of the arrest. The hearing was held, and the
appeal from the second denial of the motion for new trial came to
the supreme court as Wisham H."6 Despite the warning of the
supreme court in Wisham I,6 the trial judge allowed the prosecution
to cross-examine the jurors as to the effect (or really non-effect) of
the event upon the deliberations and the verdict, and this question-
ing was held in Wisham II to violate the prohibition of the statute.68
The court has now held clearly that evidence of the mental pro-
cesses and reasons for decision of the jury are inadmissible in sup-
port of a verdict as well as in impeachment thereof-despite the
rather specific language of the statute. Such a decision is fully in
keeping with the policy of protecting the confidentiality of jury
deliberations and the freedom of discussion among jurors and of
preserving the doctrine of finality of verdicts.
In this very close case,69 the court held that the conduct and the
63. LA. R.S. 15:470 (1950) provides:
No juror, grand or petit, is competent to testify to his own or his fellows' miscon-
duct, or to give evidence to explain, qualify or impeach any indictment or any ver-
dict found by the body of which he is or was a member; but every juror, grand or
petit, is a competent witness to rebut any attack upon the regularity of the con-
duct or of the findings of the body of which he is or was a member.
64. State v. Wisham, 371 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1979); State v. Marchand, 362 So. 2d
1090 (La. 1978). See FED. R. EVID. 606.
65. State v. Wisham, 371 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1979).
66. State v. Wisham, 384 So. 2d 385 (La. 1980).
67. 371 So. 2d at 1154 n.2.
68. LA. R.S. 15:470 (1950).
69. Justice Watson concurred in the result. Justice Blanche dissented without
reasons. Justice Marcus dissented on the basis that the testimony of the jurors was
prohibited by the statute, and that any change in the Louisiana rule required
legislative action.
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communication had been established by the jurors' testimony, thus
creating a presumption of prejudice which the state failed to rebut.
As a result, the supreme court reversed and remanded for a new
trial, perhaps to set the stage for Wisham III.
In State v. Charles"0 the trial court on the last day of trial in an
armed robbery case advised both the prosecutor and defense coun-
sel that certain jurors had been threatened and that because of the
threats the jury would be polled by written ballot."'The trial judge
provided no other information about the alleged threats, and the
supreme court indicated that the record simply establishes that
some type of threat was made to one juror. With the record in this
state it is difficult to see why the court remanded for an evidentiary
hearing."2 To do so makes this case simply a wasted appeal. This
writer feels that this would have been the ideal case to emphasize
that the trial court has much discretion in denying motions for new
trial and motions to hold evidentiary hearings and that here the
defendant had simply failed to show any abuse of such discretion. As
it now stands, this case leaves open the question of when a trial
judge must hold an evidentiary hearing.
70. 377 So. 2d 344 (La. 1979).
71. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 812.
72. Chief Justice Summers and Justice Marcus dissented. 377 So. 2d at 346 (Sum-
mers, C.J., and Marcus, J., dissenting).
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